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 ABSTRACT 
 
FOREIGN AID AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
 AID FUNGIBILITY IN MALAWI 
 
BY 
MSOWOYA, Chimwemwe Don 
 
This paper sets out to produce credible empirical evidence on aid fungibility in Malawi. To 
this end, the paper looks at two forms of fungibility namely: substitution of aid for 
government funding; and whether or not aid is used to reduce taxes effort in Malawi. First 
and foremost, the paper investigates whether or not aid resources substitute for government 
funding in three key sectors that traditionally receive the lion’s share of Official Development 
Assistance in Malawi namely; Agriculture, Education and Health sectors. Secondly, the paper 
also investigates whether or not aid resources substitute for government revenue collection 
efforts by examining the impact of ODA on tax effort in Malawi. The results of the 
fungibility analysis reveal that aid fungibility is prevalent most prevalent in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and not Education and Health. On the other hand, the results of the analysis of the 
impact of ODA on tax effort in Malawi show that ODA has a positive impact on the tax effort 
in Malawi which implies that aid resources are not used to substitute for tax revenue. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The term “foreign aid” can denote different interventions, ranging from humanitarian support 
to military assistance.  In this paper, however, it refers to “Official Development Assistance 
(ODA)” or “aid” that is given to Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in order to increase 
economic growth and development, and consist of at least a 25% grant component in the total 
aid disbursed. 1 According to Whitaker (2006), “over the past 50 years, foreign aid has 
emerged as the dominant strategy for alleviating poverty in developing countries.  During this 
time period major international institutions, such as the United Nations, World Bank, and 
International Monetary Fund gained prominence in global economic affairs.  Yet it seems that 
sixty years later, the lesser developed countries of the world continue to suffer from 
economic hardship, raising questions of whether foreign aid is a worthwhile and effective 
approach to boosting growth and development in poor countries.”2 
Malawi has been a recipient of ODA since its independence in 1964. The share of aid 
resources in Malawi’s national budget fluctuates between 33% and 57%, with project-tied aid 
constituting the main external source of funding. Throughout most of Malawi’s period of 
independence, the African Development Bank/African Development Fund (AfDB/AfDF), the 
World Bank International Development Association (IDA), the United Kingdom through the 
Department of International Development (DFID), Japan through the Japanese Cooperation 
Development Agency (JICA), European Commission (EC),the United States through United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Ireland through Irish Aid, and 
                                                          
1 John Degngol-Martinussen, and P. Engberg-Pedersen, “Aid: Understanding International Development 
Cooperation.” (London and New York: Zed Books, 2003). 
2 Mark T. Whitaker, 2009. The Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth. Diss., Duquesne University, 
Pennsylvania, 2009, 1-5 
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Germany through German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)   have traditionally been 
the main sources of external financial assistance. The main aid instruments that are used in 
disbursing aid in Malawi are Direct Project Support, Sector Budget Support (SBS) and 
General Budget Support (GBS). In spite being a long term beneficiary of ODA, Malawi has 
failed to make headway in achieving impactful economic development. The country has 
remained much as it was when it attained independence 47 years ago if not worse. The 
economy remains heavily dependent on agriculture and 80% of the population still live in 
rural areas.3 The obvious question would be to ask why the country has not succeeded in 
breaking the vicious poverty cycle that has long plagued its people despite receiving large 
inflows of foreign aid.  
A critical issue that is widely discussed in the donor community in relation to aid 
ineffectiveness is aid fungibility.” Simply put, aid fungibility is when categorical aid or aid 
that is earmarked for a certain sector or project (i) substitutes for government funding, (ii) is 
used to reduce taxes or (iii) is diverted to other unintended sectors.4 When aid is fungible, its 
impact on a country’s economic growth and development is rendered ineffective.  Thus aid 
fungibility is seen as one of the potential factors contributing to the derailment of the impact 
of aid in LDCs. Given the potentially adverse effects of aid fungibility on aid effectiveness in 
aid recipient countries, it is imperative to investigate the extent to which the phenomena 
exists in the recipient countries in order curtail its negative impact.  Thus paper seeks to 
investigate the existence of the aid fungibility phenomenon in Malawi. More specifically, the 
paper will seek to establish whether or not foreign aid substitutes for government funding and 
tax revenue in Malawi. Finally, the paper will endeavor to come up with policy 
recommendations on how aid can be made more effective in Malawi based upon the findings. 
                                                          
3 Central Intelligence Agency (US). The World Fact Book. Retrieved May 28, 2011 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mi.html>. 
4 Fumiko Tamura, “Spending Substitution or Additional Funding? The Estimation of Endogenous Foreign Aid 
Fungibility” (Department of Economics, Brown University, Rhode Island, USA, 2005). 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The rationale behind foreign aid disbursement is to provide developing countries like Malawi 
with a positive incentive for maximum national effort to increase the rate of economic growth. 
However, despite six years of registering consistent levels of economic growth, Malawi 
remains heavily dependent on foreign aid, whose payments account for more than 30% of 
government income. According to Tarekegn (2002), “One of the main channels through 
which foreign aid influences development outcomes is through its impact on the recipient 
country’s public expenditures. This link between foreign aid and public expenditure is 
however, not straightforward, because some part of the aid is fungible.” 5  Donors are 
concerned that instead of being used for economic growth and development, foreign aid is 
used to finance non-developmental expenditure such as procurement of military equipment, 
repayment of public debt, cover up for tax reduction, or even leak into politicians’ pockets. 
Consequently, aid fungibility is frequently attributed to donor fatigue and therefore it is a 
phenomenon that is considered a very fundamental problem for aid recipient countries and 
donors alike.   
Aid fungibility has several detrimental impacts on the effectiveness of aid in developing 
countries. If indeed aid is fungible, then it becomes very difficult to assess its impact in 
targeted sectors because of the fact that it becomes complicated and difficult to assess which 
activities the aid resources ultimately support. Consecutively, this makes it harder for the 
recipient countries to design ideal policies necessary for economic growth and development. 
In addition, the assessment of the efficacy of foreign aid becomes very problematical. In 
Malawi, the potential existence of aid fungibility raises two critical issues. Firstly, to what 
extent is aid fungible in Malawi? Secondly, which areas or sectors is aid fungibility most 
                                                          
5 Jifar Tarekegn, “The Impact of Foreign aid on Public Spending: The case of Ethiopia” (master thesis, 
SCHOOL of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University), 3-6. 
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prominent?  Thirdly, how does foreign aid influence tax revenue collection?  Previous studies 
have revealed that a certain percentage of foreign aid is fungible and therefore can weaken 
domestic revenue collection, but there are other studies that have also found evidence 
indicating the other way round. However, if aid is indeed fungible, then aid is likely to be 
ineffective in boosting economic growth, reducing poverty and contributing to overall 
development. Moreover, if aid fungibility discourages the collection tax, it may propagate or 
even increase aid dependency in recipient countries. 
1.3 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The generic purpose of this research study is to produce credible empirical evidence on aid 
fungibility in Malawi. To this end, the paper will look at two forms of fungibility namely: 
whether or not aid substitutes for government funding; and whether or not aid is used to 
reduce taxes effort in Malawi. First and foremost, the paper will investigate whether or not 
aid resources substitute for government funding in three key sectors that traditionally receive 
the lion’s share of ODA in Malawi namely; Agriculture, Education and Health. Thereafter, 
the paper will investigate whether or not aid resources substitute for government revenue 
collection efforts.  This will be achieved by investigating the impact of ODA on tax effort in 
Malawi. 
 
The specific objectives of this paper are to: 
• Investigate whether or not Malawi government contribution toward sector funding 
increases or decreases in response to inflows of ODA. 
• Investigate whether or not the tax revenue collection in Malawi increases or reduces 
in response to inflows of ODA. 
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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
To date, a significant level of fungibility literature is in existence. However, most of the aid 
fungibility studies that have been carried out were done using cross-country analysis. Thus, 
these studies do not clearly assess the effects of foreign aid on funding and spending in 
individual public sectors within the aid recipient countries.6 This has been made apparent by 
the fact that most of the previous cross-country based studies have yielded mixed results on 
the impact of aid on public sectors spending. Therefore, the only credible way to clearly 
assess the different impact of aid on the targeted public sectors’ spending is to conduct aid 
fungibility studies in a country specific context. 
Surprisingly, there are only a few published studies that have been conducted on the impact 
of foreign aid in Malawi. The most recent and notable study was conducted by Fagernas and 
Roberts (2004) where they did a cross country based analysis  on overall Fiscal Impact of Aid 
in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi from 1970 to 2000. The theme of Fagernas and Roberts’ 
paper is “The impact of aid on public expenditure and other fiscal aggregates in aid-recipient 
countries, seen as a link in the chain of causality leading from aid to economic growth and 
poverty reduction.”7  However, their paper does not focus on aid fungibility per se but uses 
econometric analysis to examine the impact of aid on economic growth in the three countries. 
Aside from this study, no other published studies on aid fungibility in Malawi exist. Thus, the 
findings from this study will go a long way in filling the information void on aid fungibility 
in Malawi.  
In addition, fungibility is important in Malawi, because foreign aid constitutes a sizeable 
component in the country’s public finance and expenditure. Thus an investigation into the 
                                                          
6  Jifar Tarekegn, “The Impact of Foreign aid on Public Spending: The case of Ethiopia” (master thesis, 
SCHOOL of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University), 3-2. 
7 Sonja Fagernäs and Cedrik Schurich. The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Malawi. No. 7. 2004.1-2. 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/23406/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/4F08D720-4E42-
47BC-8157-D3D995138335/en/esau_wp07.pdf 
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potential existence of aid fungibility may provide invaluable information about the intricacies 
of aid on public spending and thus help to lay down a solid platform for policy makers to take 
appropriate action in managing the fungibility phenomenon. Furthermore, the outcome of this 
study could be instrumental in implementation of public sector initiatives, monitoring and 
evaluation and improving public policy design in the area of foreign aid allocation to public 
spending. 
1.5 OVERALL APPROACH  AND DATA SOURCES 
According to Tarekegn (2002), almost all studies on aid fungibility use an aid fungibility 
model which “is derived from utility maximization of government’s choice for two types’ of 
public goods that are used for consumption and investment purposes. The dependent variable 
is classified as non-developmental (consumption) and developmental (investment) spending. 
From the utility maximization of government choice, the model derives explanatory variables 
for sector specific government spending such as GDP (gross domestic product), sector 
specific aid and other aid which is given to other sector spending.”8 Such models utilize time 
series data for a specified period ranging from 20 to 30 years. However, the results from these 
cross-country regression based studies have produced confusion than robust conclusions. 
Furthermore, the findings from these studies have contributed little or nothing on the impact 
of aid fungibility in individual aid recipient countries. 
Given the obvious failures of previous empirical approaches to produce useful insights, this 
study utilizes a less rigorous method of analyzing aid fungibility. The paper will use a simple 
fungibility analytical framework to examine aid fungibility in agriculture, education and 
                                                          
8 Jifar Tarekegn, “The Impact of Foreign aid on Public Spending: The case of Ethiopia” (master thesis, 
SCHOOL of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University), 5-6. 
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health sectors from 1999-2006. Thus, the paper will use a simple regression model to 
examine the impact of ODA on tax effort in Malawi.   
The research study will use secondary data on fiscal aggregates such as total government 
spending, development expenditure, recurrent expenditure, and ODA inflows.  The data will 
be collected from various official government budget documents and reports and also from 
credible web-based data-banks which will include but are not limited to: the National 
Statistical Office of Malawi Data Base; Research Bank of Malawi Data Base; World Bank 
Data; International Monetary Fund Data Base; OECD Statistics; and Ministry of Finance 
(Malawi) Data Base.  
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 FOREIGN AID AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE 
Foreign aid can be defined as “the transfer of concessionary resources, usually from foreign 
government or international institution, to a government or non-governmental organization in 
a recipient country.” 9  Foreign aid is disbursed for a milliard of reasons which include 
diplomacy, to influence development, for cultural and commercial reasons. Foreign aid 
resource flows are normally in the form of concessionary loans and grants which may jointly 
be generally described as ODA. However, this definition omits other concessional aid 
resources, more especially aid flows from voluntary or private agencies such as non-
governmental organization or the civil society at large. More appropriately, the Development 
Assistance Committee’s (DAC) definition of ODA includes grants or loans which are given 
                                                          
9 Jifar Tarekegn, “The Impact of Foreign aid on Public Spending: The case of Ethiopia” (master thesis, 
SCHOOL of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University), 8-9. 
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to recipient country on concessional financial terms (for loans, the loan should comprise of at 
least a 25% grant element) with aim of promoting economic development and welfare. ODA 
is usually used to finance expenditures intended to induce or encourage economic growth and 
development in the receiving country such as building of schools and roads, and providing 
training, education, and heath. It should, however, be noted that there are some commentators 
that urge that aid the motive behind disbursement bilateral aid is not necessarily to promote 
economic growth and development in LDCs but rather it is used to promote strategic and 
political interests of bilateral donors. According to this line of thought, these strategic and 
political interests include supporting countries whose geopolitical positions are of strategic 
importance, gaining access to strategic natural resources, and creating and retaining allies.10 
   
Developing countries, more particularly Sub-Saharan countries, have been recipients of large 
amounts of foreign aid since the 1970s because of their inability to finance domestic 
development projects and programs and the absence of well-established economic and 
political institutions that can attract foreign direct investments or foreign trade.11 Generally, 
foreign aid is advocated as necessary for the promotion of economic development in the least 
developed countries (LDC's).12 A more simplified way to view foreign aid is to consider it as 
a subsidy. In this regard, aid is meant to provide temporary financial assistance to the 
recipient country in order to encourage certain long-term development traits such as 
investment in human and physical capital, the establishment of the institutions of a 
developmental state and revenue collection. However, the debate on the actual impact that 
foreign aid has had on foreign aid in developing countries has been fraught with disagreement.  
                                                          
10 AFRODAD. A Critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donor  Harmonization: The Case of Malawi  
(2007).  http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/publications/Aid%20Mgmt%20Malawi%20Final.pdf 
11 Sandrina Moreira, “Evaluating the Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study” 
Journal of Economic Development 25 vol. 30 (2005), http://www.jed.or.kr/full-text/30-2/J02_702.PDF. 
12 Eroğlu, Ömer and Ali Yavuz, “The Role of Foreign Aid in Economic Development of Developing countries,” 
Suleyman Demirel University, http://ces.epoka.edu.al/icme/a14.pdf. 
 9 
 
According to Todaro and Smith (2011), on the one hand are economists who claim that 
foreign aid has promoted growth and structural transformations in many developing countries. 
Evidence for successful aid is particularly strong in targeted programs with defined objectives, 
for example in Botswana and South Korea, where foreign assistance supported local development 
efforts and the countries were gradually weaned off aid.  On the other hand are critics who 
contend that aid fails to promote faster economic growth but may hinder it by replacing 
investment and domestic savings and by worsening balance of payment deficits as a result of 
rising debt repayment and the linking of aid to donor-country exports.13  Indeed, there are 
many cases where aid has seemingly failed to assist countries in accomplishing their 
developmental objectives. Instead, it has been contended that the aid has actually distorted 
expenditure decision-making, discouraged revenue collection and undermined the incentives 
to build state capacity.14 Furthermore, some critics charge that foreign aid has been a failure 
because it has been appropriated by corrupt bureaucrats and has engendered a welfare 
mentality on the part of recipient nations. The prospect of detrimental effects of aid appears 
predominantly severe in sub-Saharan Africa, where most countries have now received 
substantial aid volumes for more than five decades. Views such as these seem to be gaining 
popular support given the fact that in almost all of sub-Saharan Africa developing countries, 
little economic development has taken place despite large inflows of foreign aid from 
developed countries. This is reflected in the persistently high levels of unemployment, 
indebtedness, absolute poverty and poor economic performance in these developing countries.   
 
                                                          
13 M. Todaro and S. Smith, Economic Development (New York: Addison-Wesley, 2011),  697. 
14 Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle. "An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on 
aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa." Center for Global Development working paper 74 
(2006): 11-05. 
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The impact of foreign aid in developing countries has been made more ambiguous by the fact 
that most of the cross-country regression-based studies that have been carried out have 
produced baffling rather than robust conclusions. In addition, the literature from these cross-
country based studies has little or nothing to contribute when it comes to individual 
countries.15 For instance, using cointegration analysis to examine the effectiveness of foreign 
aid on economic growth in the six poorest and highly aid dependent African countries 
(Malawi inclusive), Mallik (2008) found evidence of a “long-run relationship between per-
capita real GDP, aid as a percentage of GDP, investment as a percentage of GDP and 
openness.” The long-run effect of aid on growth, however, was negative for most of the 
countries. On the contrary, using Papanek-type regression to evaluate impact on foreign aid 
on development in developing countries, Moreira (2005) found that aid has less effect on 
growth in the short-run than in the long-run.  Other studies on the impact of aid on economic 
development in developing countries conducted by Nyoni (2000), Njeru (2003), Phijaisanit 
(2010) and Quibria (2010) have seemingly yielded mixed results, thus raising suggestions 
that the impact of foreign aid may differ across countries. 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the role and impact of foreign aid in promoting economic 
development in developing countries, there is need for more country-specific studies in order 
to better analyze the intricate mechanisms and conditions that allow for the efficient and 
effective utilization of foreign aid in developing countries’ development process. 
 
                                                          
15 Ghulam Mohey-ud-din,  “Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Development in Pakistan,”( 2005) < 
http://mpra .ub.uni-muenchen.de/1211/1/MPRA_paper_1211.pdf>. 
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2.3 EMPERICAL LITERATURE 
According to Fagernäs and Schurich (2004), existing literature on the fiscal impacts of aid 
may be divided into two categories.  The first is fungibility literature which concentrates on 
whether aid is spent on those sectors where it was intended, such as agriculture, education 
and health. The second is fiscal response literature which concentrates on the analysis of the 
impact of aid on fiscal aggregates such as total spending, tax revenue, public investment, 
public consumption, domestic borrowing and budget deficit.16   
 
Numerous studies have been conducted on both aid fungibility and fiscal responses to aid. 
However, the issues have been approached in two different ways in most literature. The first 
approach is largely based on a model that was used by McGuire (1978) and is concentrates on 
the issue of aid fungibility. “According to this approach, foreign aid is said to be fungible if 
the recipient country uses the aid resources for purposes other than those intended by the 
donors. The assumption is that donors intend aid flow to finance specific activities and the 
question is whether the flow is diverted to other purposes.”17 This simply implies that aid 
meant for investment is deliberately diverted to government consumption spending, which 
reduces its impact on economic growth. In his study, McGuire (1978) developed a model of 
estimating the effect of a subsidy on the receiver’s resource constraint with an application to 
the United States Local Governments. His findings indicate that a large and growing fraction 
of education grants were fungible. Studies that have adopted this approach include Feyzioglu 
et al. (1998), Pack and Pack (1990), Khilji and Zampelli (1991), and Swaroop et al. (2000). 
For instance, Pack and Pack analyzed the fiscal response of aid in Indonesia between 1970 
                                                          
16 Sonja Fagernäs and Cedrik Schurich. The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Malawi. No. 7. 2004.1-2. 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/23406/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/4F08D720-4E42-
47BC-8157-D3D995138335/en/esau_wp07.pdf 
17 Badri Prasad Bhattarai  Foreign Aid and Government’s Fiscal Behavior in Nepal: An Empirical Analysis 
School of Economics and Finance University of Western Sydney 2007 
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and 1990 using a variant of the McGuire (1978) type model. Their findings indicated that 
foreign aid did not reduce domestic revenue collection efforts, but rather stimulated total 
public expenditure. 
 
The second approach is based on a type of model that was developed by Heller (1975). This 
approach postulates a government utility-maximizing behavior, and analyses the response of 
different elements of government expenditure to budget constraint such as foreign aid 
borrowing and revenue. According to Bhattarai (2007), the approach assumes that 
“governments set targets for various expenditures and also set revenue targets for tax and 
borrowing. Then they maximize their goal (economic growth or social welfare) by attaining 
these revenue and expenditure targets. The assumption here is that the realization of revenue 
and expenditure targets maximizes the goals. The flow of aid can change either the 
government’s expenditure targets or revenue targets. Government can also adjust its both 
expenditure and revenue/borrowing targets in response to aid”18. In his study, Heller (1975) 
considered the impact of different types of aid (grant and loan) on several categories of public 
expenditures such as socio-economic consumption in the public sector, civil consumption in 
the public sector, public expenditure for developmental purposes, government revenue and 
domestic borrowing in eleven African countries. His findings indicated that aid increases 
both government investment and consumption and reduces taxes and domestic borrowing. 
Heller also found that, grant directly contributes to increased public consumption and 
indirectly to private consumption by reducing taxes.19    
 
                                                          
18 Badri Prasad Bhattarai  Foreign Aid and Government’s Fiscal Behavior in Nepal: An Empirical Analysis 
School of Economics and Finance University of Western Sydney 2007. 
19 Peter .S Heller,. (1975) “A Model of Public Fiscal Behaviour in Developing Countries:Aid, Investment and 
Taxation” American Economic Review, 65: 429–45. 
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Studies that have adopted this approach include Mosley et al. (1987), Gang and Khan (1991), 
Khan and Hoshino (1992), Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998), McGillivray (2000), and 
McGillivray and Ouattara (2003). For Instance, Khan and Hoshino analyzed  the  fiscal 
response to  aid in five  (5) South and  South East Asian countries between 1956 and 1976) 
using a variant of the Heller (1975) type model. Their results indicate that loans are 
encourage investment more than grants, and that though grants reduced tax burdens, loans 
increased it. Appendix 1 provides a summary of studies of all the fiscal response models 
discussed in this paper. 
 
2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This analytical framework is adopted from a study by Gupta et al. (2003) where they 
examined the foreign aid and revenue response. According to the framework, the relationship 
between foreign aid and revenues could be viewed in terms of the government’s budget 
constraint in a given period, written as follows: 
G = T + A + B,                                                        (1) 
 
where G is government expenditure, T is recurrent  revenue, A is aid  (comprising both grants  
and loans), and B is net domestic borrowing  (countries are  assumed  to  have  no  access to  
non-concessionary foreign borrowing). Thus, in response to an exogenous increase in aid, a 
government could either: 
(i) Reduce the tax effort,  
(ii) Increase expenditure,  
(iii)  Adjust downward domestic borrowing in order to meet budget constraints, or  
(iv)  Choose a combination of (i) through (iii).  
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In the first instance, the government chooses to pass the benefits of higher inflows to the 
private sector by reducing the tax effort. At the extreme, the government could decide to 
reduce the effort by the entire amount of the aid while holding aggregate public expenditure 
(G) and borrowing (B) constant. In an extreme case, this behavior can cause the tax effort to 
decline by the full amount of aid inflows. 20 
 
Under the second scenario, where expenditures increase in response to increase in aid, tax 
effort may either increase or decrease depending on the form aid takes and on the magnitude 
of the response of expenditures to aid. If the increase in expenditures is smaller than the 
increase in aid (which implies that the aid is fungible), holding domestic borrowing 
unchanged (B = 0), tax effort would decline. If the expenditures increase greater than the 
increase in aid, tax revenue should increase. Finally, consider the implications of a third 
scenario, where aid induces a decrease in domestic borrowing. In this scenario, the 
government chooses not to spend foreign aid resources. This may be the case when the 
government decides to increase deposits in the banking system in order to release resources 
for the private sector. 
2.5 AID AND FISCAL POLICY IN MALAWI 
2.5.1 Macroeconomic Background 
 
Malawi is a land landlocked country in the Southern Africa. It ranks among the world's least 
developed countries. The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture which accounts for 
more than 70% of GDP and 90% of export revenues. In addition, the economy is highly 
dependent on ODA from the World Bank, Africa Development Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, and other bilateral and multilateral donor nations. Malawi gained its independence in 
                                                          
20 Sanjeev Gupta, Pivovarsky, Alexander, Benedict J. Clements, and Erwin Tiongson. Foreign aid and revenue 
response: does the composition of aid matter?. Vol. 3. International Monetary Fund, 2003.  
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1964 under a one party system (dictatorship) that was led by the Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. 
Since gaining independence, macroeconomic stability has remained very elusive. For the 
most part, the country's macroeconomic background has been characterized by unstable GDP 
growth, persistent budget and current account deficits and high inflation and interest rates. 21 
 
In the 1970s, economic growth averaged about 7% per year. By historical standards, the GDP 
growth rates were quite high in this period with most of the resources that financed GDP and 
investment growth coming from international capital markets. A large share of these external 
resource inflows were in the form of non-concessional loans, though donor grant inflows 
were relatively low. However, the country’s strong growth rates took a down turn in the 
1980s. 
Figure 2.1: MALAWI GDP Growth Rate Annual Percentage (1964-2010) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
                                                          
21 Sonja Fagernäs and Cedrik Schurich. The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Malawi. No. 7. 2004.1-2. 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/23406/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/4F08D720-4E42-
47BC-8157-D3D995138335/en/esau_wp07.pdf 
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Beginning in 1979, the country was hit by a series of internal and external shocks comprising 
of the global recession, falling tobacco prices on the world market, rising oil prices, and weak 
domestic economic policies.22 In addition, between 1979 and 1981, Malawi lost its primary 
trade route that was used to transport about 80-90% of exports and imports, due to the closure 
of the railway line neighboring Mozambique and this led to a sharp rise in transport costs.23 
Consequently, the average growth rate dropped from a healthy 7% in the 1970s to about 2%. 
The situation was worsened by the fact that between 1978 and 1982, external debt servicing 
doubled to 28% of current expenditure which forced the country to reschedule its debt service 
obligations (IMF, 1997). This led to a deterioration of the budget and current account deficits 
despite government efforts to increase tax revenue to service its external debts. 
Figure 2.2: Malawi Budget deficit (including Grants) as a share of GDP (1970-2010) 
 
Source: IMF, MoF 
 
Starting in 1981, Malawi undertook the first structural adjustment programme which was 
supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Not surprisingly, most of the 
                                                          
22 Tobacco  has always been Malawi’s main export and therefore it is the main source of foreign currency 
23 Sonja Fagernäs and Cedrik Schurich. The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Malawi. No. 7. 2004.1-2. 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/23406/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/4F08D720-4E42-
47BC-8157-D3D995138335/en/esau_wp07.pdf 
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reforms were targeted at reforming agricultural sector. Following the reform, most of the 
pricing and agriculture marketing policies were gradually liberalized. However, despite these 
reforms, growth in the 1980s was still elusive mainly because of declining in the terms of 
trade, erratic implementation of the reforms, and a narrow agricultural production base.  
 
Malawi started a transition to democracy in the early 1990s. This led to a significant rise in 
the number of donors and aid inflows. In the 1990s, IMF and World Bank policies attempted 
to focus on poverty reduction. The country also embarked on the second round of structural 
adjustment programmes which included domestic markets liberalization, reforms in trade, 
and privatization of parastatals. Despite the reforms, economic growth remained elusive 
between 1990 and 1994, averaging about 1.3% per year. The deteriorating economic 
conditions were further worsened by two major droughts (between 1992 and 1994), declining 
of tobacco prices on the world market and unrestrained spending in the final year of Dr. H. K. 
Banda’s dictatorial regime.  
 
According to an IMF Report (1997), in 1994, Malawi became a democratic state and held the 
first elections in its history. The elections were won by the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
party which was then led by Malawi’s first democratically elected president, Dr. Bakili 
Muluzi. However, the new government came in at a time when the country was experiencing 
drought which compelled it to maintain high expenditure on drought relief. Worse more, in 
1995, donors froze aid commitments in response to the loss of fiscal control by the 
government at the end of Dr. Banda’s regime hence aid inflows dropped significantly. During 
this time, the budget deficit shot up to 37% of GDP (highest deficit on record to date) and 
inflation rose to about 79%.24  
                                                          
24 International Monetary Fund (1997) Malawi – Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country 
Report No. 97/107, IMF, Washington, DC 
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Figure 2.3: Inflation Rate in Malawi (1964-2010) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
To its credit, the newly elected government was quick to respond to the deteriorating 
economic situation and managed to bring down the budget deficit to 7.5% of GDP and 
inflation to 8% by 1997. This was achieved through the introduction of a Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in 1995 which gave Government Ministries a three-year 
resource basket to be spent according to medium-term strategies that were prioritized at the 
time. Furthermore, the introduction of a Cash Budget System in 1996 compelled Ministries to 
spend within the resources that were allocated to them which assisted government to keep 
expenditure in check.25  
 
However, the fiscal deficit began to spiral out of control again in 1997, mostly owing to 
administrative failures in tax collection which led to lower revenue growth. Public 
expenditure in preparation to the 1999 elections also exacerbated the fiscal deficit. The 
macroeconomic situation further deteriorated when the country experienced droughts in 2001 
and 2002. The situation was further compounded by the suspension of financial assistance by 
                                                          
25 Sonja Fagernäs and Cedrik Schurich The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Malawi  Economic and  Statistics Analysis 
Unit Overseas Development Institute/Department for International Development, UK. 
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IMF and bilateral donors in 2001 and 2002 respectively due to fiscal mismanagement. 
Macroeconomic performance between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 was not satisfactory, but it 
improved significantly in 2004. Weak fiscal performance during this period brought the 
country to the verge of a financial crisis. The government ran large fiscal deficits of more 
than 6% of GDP in each fiscal year. Worse more, this period saw a substantial reduction in 
foreign budgetary aid which meant that the deficits had to be financed using domestic 
(borrowing) resources. The resulting increase in government borrowing (from local banks) 
pushed up interest rates to a record high of 24%. In addition, economic growth was 
significantly hindered by the impact of HIV and AIDS whose prevalence rate had reached 
13% (MoF Report, 2006). 
Figure 2.4: Interest Rate in Malawi (1980-2008) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
The election of President Bingu wa Mutharika in 2004 brought significant improvements in 
economic management in Malawi. The new government adopted a policy of zero tolerance 
on corruption and upheld the principles of rule of law, thus ushering the country into a new 
era of sound governance and prudent economic policies that won back the support and 
confidence of donors (MoF, 2006). The country’s economic growth also improved, averaging 
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6.5% between 2004 and 2008, compared to just 3.3% in the period between 1996 and 2005. 
In 2008, the economy grew by 9.7% in real terms compared to the 7.9% the previous year. 
The strong economic performance was largely attributed to good performance in agriculture 
production that was brought about by weather and the government’s fertilizer subsidy for 
smallholder farmers who contribute 70% of agricultural GDP. In addition, inflation stood at 
8.7%, sustaining single digit levels that were attained in 2007. The rate of inflation has been 
declining since 2005, due to the controlling in fuel and food prices and restrained credit 
growth.26  
 
Despite the remarkable macroeconomic performance of recent years, Malawi is still very 
much susceptible to external shocks, particularly in terms of oil prices, due to high imports 
volumes and its geographical location (Malawi is a land locked country). Because the 
Malawi’s economic is predominantly agricultural, its economic performance is at the mercy 
of weather conditions leaving it ever more exposed to climate change. Furthermore, the 
government faces a number of critical challenges chief among which satisfying foreign 
donors, dealing with environmental problems, development of a market economy, dealing 
with rampant corruption, dealing with the rapidly growing problem of HIV/AIDS and 
improving health care and educational facilities.  
2.5.2 External Assistance in Malawi 
 
Since independence, Malawi has been heavily reliant on external assistance to finance a large 
share of the government's development and deficit budgets. For instance, in the 2006/2007 
fiscal year, ODA accounted for 80% of the development budget and 45% of the total budget 
for the Malawi Government.  A visual inspection of figures 4.4 and 4.5 seems to indicate that 
                                                          
26 Van Klaveren, Maarten, Kea Tijdens, Melanie Hughie-Williams, and N. Ramos Martin. "An overview of 
women’s work and employment in Brazil." (2009). www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/Country_Report_No6-
Malawi_EN.pdf 
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for the most part, ODA grants and loans are positively correlated. Between 1980 and the 
early 2000s loans and grants had crudely equal shares of GDP. Throughout this period, grants 
had been on the rise and much less volatile than loans which seem to have been very volatile. 
Beginning the early 2000s, grants have generally followed an upward trend as opposed to 
loans which seem to have been on a downward spiral.  
Figure 2.4 ODA as a share of Malawi’s Gross National Income (1964-2010) 
 
Source: World Bank 
Figure 2.5: Grants and Loans as a share of GDP in Malawi 
 
Source: IMF, MoF 
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After bieng governed by a single-party system for three decades, a new government was 
elected into power in 1994 following the Malawi’s first ever free and fair democratic 
elections. The change to a democratic sytem of government  led to renewed aid commitments 
by blateral and  multilateral aid agencies. Consequently, a number of donor agencies opened 
representative offices to in  order to encourage closer discourse and to monitor 
implementation of programmes that the aid agencies supported. Since then, aid inflows to 
Malawi have varied within the ranges of USD 375 million to USD 550 million (MoF, 
2010). 27  According to this report, the fluctuations are attributed to delays in project 
implementation and subsequent disbursements, by increased aid flows in response to major 
droughts – in the form of quick-disbursing emergency-type programmes, and by significant 
fluctuations in balance of payments support/GBS budget support associated with policy 
reform conditions. 
2.5.3 Aid Disbursement Modalities in Malawi 
 
In the 47 years that Malawi has been receiving foreign assistance, the largest donors have 
been the European Community. The UK by far remains Malawi’s largest bilateral donor. 
However, Canada, Japan, Norway, Germany, USA, African Development Bank/African 
Development Fund (AfDB/AfDF) International Development Association (IDA) and have 
also contributed substantially to aid flowing into Malawi. Aid from these donors is comprised 
of disbursements that are made directly to government through project and budget support 
and those disbursements that are overseen by the donors themselves or through Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  
 
                                                          
27 Malawi Government, Ministry of Finance. A Country Evaluation of the Paris Declaration for Malawi, 2010.   
9-6. www.oecd.org/countries/malawi/47655679.pdf 
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Figure 2.6 DAC Countries Contribution 1970-2009 (in US Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Throughout the period Malawi  has been receiving development assistance, foreign aid has 
been equally spread between bilateral and multilateral aid (See Appendix 2A). According to 
Ministry fo Fiance Report (2010),  Multilateral finance started in the mid 1980s by the World 
Bank through a series of structural adjustment operations that  were a continuation of policy-
based lending. Roughly 30% of multilateral lending has been provided as General Budgetory 
Support (GBS), while the other 70% has been in the form of project investment lending in 
sectors like health, road transport, education, and water supply, as well as emergency relief 
type operations.28 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Malawi Government, Ministry of Finance. A Country Evaluation of the Paris Declaration for Malawi, 2010.   
9-6. www.oecd.org/countries/malawi/47655679.pdf 
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Figure 2.7: Aid Allocation in selected sectors in millions of USD (1995-2009) 
 
Source: OECD DAC CRS Database (2010) 
 
With regard to the aid modalities, GBS became a more dominant channel of aid disbursement 
from the year 2002. Prior to 2002, most of the aid was through project support. Nevertheless, 
project support has continually risen since the 1990s.  This is because donors have a bigger 
role in managing project aid compared to GBS. More importantly, project aid seems to have 
been more consistent than GBS because it has not been severely affected by political 
developments as compared to GBS (See Appendix 2C). It is important to note that most 
governments prefer GBS because it gives them flexibility in the way they can spend the aid 
funds. In addition, because GBS is channeled through the government financial system, it 
goes a long way in strengthening the public financial systems. However, donors prefer 
project support because of their skepticism about government commitment to spend aid funds 
on earmarked activities. Aside from the lack of confidence in the Malawi government’s 
procurement accounting system, most donors fear that aid funds may be pocketed by corrupt 
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government officials and that is why most of the donors set up separate Programme 
Implementation Units (PIUs).29 
Figure 2.8: Aid Modalities (1995-2009) 
 
Source: OECD DAC CRS Database (2010) 
To put this dichotomy of aid modalities into perspective, in the 2008/09 financial year, GBS 
constituted only 21% of total aid flow. On the other hand, direct project support constituted 
56% of total funding while the remaining 23% was pooled funding30.  
 
As far as aid by themes is concerned, the breakdown received in 2008/09 shows that the   
most of the funding went to the Social Development theme, taking up 44% of total aid. 
Improved Governance was the second most funded theme (30%), followed by Sustainable 
Economic Growth (15%), Infrastructure Development (6%) and Social Protection and 
Disaster Risk Management taking up (5%). Within Social Development, the sector that has 
traditionally attracted most of the donor funding is Health. The aid resources that the Health 
                                                          
29 AFRODAD. A Critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donor  Harmonization: The Case of Malawi  (2007).  
http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/publications/Aid%20Mgmt%20Malawi%20Final.pdf 
 
30 Pooled Funding or Busket funding is joint funding by a number of donors of a set of activities through a 
common account, which keeps resources separate from all other resources intended for the same purpose. 
 26 
Sector receives include pooled funding for the Health Sector Wide Approach Programme 
(HSWAP). Within the same theme, the Education attracts the second largest portion of aid 
through the Nationwide Education Sector Programme (NESP). Within Sustainable Economic 
Development, the sector that traditionally attracts most of the donor funding is Agriculture 
since Malawi has a predominantly agriculture based economy.  This sector includes budget 
funding for the Agriculture Sector Wide Approach Programme (ASWAP).  In their totality, 
the HSWAP, NESP and ASWAP consume the largest share of donor aid funding. 
In as far as aid coordination is concerned, the Ministry of Finance, through its Debt and Aid 
Management Division (DAD), is the main government agency responsible for the overall 
coordination of aid and its effectiveness. This responsibility is undertaken in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation. Thus far, the country has made 
a lot of headway in coming up with clear national priorities and, in the formulation of 
national and sector programmes such as the HSWAP, ASWAP and NESP. The country has 
also adopted the Medium Term Expenditure Framework and the Common Approach to 
Budget Support (CABS) that is mostly utilized by Norway, Britain through DFID, European 
Union and Sweden.  This approach is expected to help improve the coherence and 
coordination of donor responses to national needs (AFRODAD, 2007). Other mechanisms in 
coordination efforts and management of aid resources efforts included holding frequent 
meeting with donors and Ministers of key Ministries.31  
2.6 GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE TRENDS 
 
Since gaining independence, Government revenues have widely fluctuated between 15% and 
25% of GDP with the only exception being in 1994 when revenue rose to about 59% of GDP 
due to political elections (See Appendix 2D). Since the 1980s, grants and foreign loans 
                                                          
31 AFRODAD. A Critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donor  Harmonization: The Case of Malawi  
(2007).  http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/publications/Aid%20Mgmt%20Malawi%20Final.pdf 
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consisted of about 15% each. However, beginning from the 1990s, grants began to increase 
due to a surge in the number of donors that were willing to give aid to a democratically 
elected Malawi government. Since then, grants have averaged about 10% of GDP as 
compared to loans which have averaged only 6%. Domestic revenue as a share of GDP 
increased from around 15% in the 1970s to over 20% in the 1980s which indicates that tax 
effort had increased. However, during the 1990s, the percentage declined to an average of 
18% of GDP. In fact, between 1990 and 2010, domestic revenue as a share of GDP averaged 
18% which indicates that the tax effort has not improved since 1980s.  
Figure 2.10: Government Revenue by classification (1990-2010) 
 
Source: Ibid 
Total expenditure has fluctuated also widely between 20% and 40% of GDP throughout the 
period (See Appendix 2E). The only outlier was in 1994 where excessively high spending 
was as a result of uncontrolled fiscal spending in the last months leading to the first 
democratic elections and severe drought that the country experienced. However, the 
composition of government expenditure has changed over the years Total Government 
spending was classified based on economic and functional criteria, and comprises of other 
recurrent expenditure (ORT) and development expenditures. The ORT component in total 
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government spending declined throughout much of the 1970s from 70% to about 50% but 
was followed by an rising trend until the early 1990s. 
 
Figure 2.11: Expenditure and sources of finance as shares of GDP 
 
Source: World  Bank, IMF,  MoF 
 
According to Fagernäs and Roberts (2004), “this supports the argument in favour of the 
alternative theoretical formulation for the budgetary process, where different sources of 
finance are used for entitlement and discretionary expenditure”. The relationships observed 
suggest that most of the ORT expenditure is financed using domestic resources, while 
development expenditure is to a larger extend financed by external resources 
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL SPECIFICATION  
AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
3.1.1 Analytical Framework for Fungibility 
From the theoretical framework that was discusses in Chapter 2: Section 2.4, the government 
accounting formula is represented by: 
G = T + A + B,                                                              
(1) 
where G is government expenditure, T is recurrent  revenue, A is aid  (comprising both grants  
and loans), and B is net domestic borrowing (countries are  assumed  to  have  no  access to  
non-concessionary foreign borrowing). For purposes of this study, however, I shall rearrange 
this identity as 
G = R + A      (2) 
Where the simplification of R is the sum of recurrent revenue (T) and domestic borrowing 
(B). Equation 2 falls short of revealing dynamic impact of aid on fiscal aggregates. However 
it makes it possible to look at the simple influence of aid and domestic revenue on 
government expenditure. Equation 2 suggests that a rise in aid may be used to either increase 
government expenditure (G), or may be used to substitute for domestic revenue (R) while 
holding government spending constant, or a combination of both. However, the overal impact 
of aid on government spending depends on the combined impact of domestic revenue and aid. 
For instance, if government expenditure rises by more than the rise in aid, an increase in 
domestic revenue is needed to finance the deficit. 
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The point of interest here is to find out how domestic revenue responds to increases in aid. In 
an ideal situation, domestic revenue and aid should rise simultaneously in order to have 
meaningful impact in the target sector. However, the government may decide to substitute 
domestic revenue with aid thereby reducing the net expenditure in that particular sector. In an 
extreme case, the government may decide to substitute domestic resources with the full 
amount of aid. In both cases, aid would be said to be fungible. 
 
In order to determine the response of the Malawi Government to changing inflows of aid, the 
paper will use the following equation: 
    ∆G = ∆R + ∆A      (3) 
Where ∆G is the change in government expenditure, ∆R is the change in recurrent revenue 
(government contribution), ∆A is aid (donor contribution).  In the event that fungibility exists, 
it would be expected that ∆R would increase in response to a decrease in ∆A for a particular 
sector. Similarly, it would be expected that ∆R would decrease in response to an increase in 
∆A. 
 3.1.2 Model for Estimating Impact of Aid on Tax Revenue  
 
In order to empirically examine the actual effects of ODA on government tax revenue 
collection, a more statistically rigorous method of analysis is required. Thus, the study will 
adopt and utilize a regression model that was used by Gupta et al. (2003) in an IMF paper 
that analyzed the effects of foreign aid on revenue response in several countries. The model is 
expressed as follows: 
[T/GDP]i,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3TRADE + β4SIZE + β5F + β6L  + εi,t 
……..(4) 
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Where, T/GDP is tax revenue as a share of GDP, F is share of grants flows as a share of GDP, 
and L is for loans flows expressed as share of GDP. To control for the structure of the 
economy, the model includes agricultural value added (AGR) and industry value added 
(IND); openness (TRADE) expressed as the sum of exports and imports in percentage of 
GDP; and the level of economic development (SIZE) expressed as real income per capita. 
For this study, however, different variations of the above model will be run in order to 
consistently examine the impact of ODA on the tax effort in Malawi. These variations are as 
follows: 
 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3SIZE+ β4 TRADE + β5ODA + εi,t 
….……………...(5) 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3TRADE + β4SIZE + β5F + β6L  + εi,t 
…………...…(6) 
Where LnTGDP is the natural log of tax revenue as a share of GDP, Imports (IMP) and 
exports (EXP) are disaggregated from TRADE and represent openness of the economy, 
Official Development Aid (ODA) is comprised of both grants and loans. 
 
3.2  METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1 FUNGIBILITY TESTS  
 
The main issue being investigated here is aid fungibility. More specifically, I want to find out 
if the Malawi Government takes advantage of aid inflows to reduce the amount of domestic 
resources that are allocated to each of the Ministries under review. Thus the main hypothesis 
that is being tested is: 
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• Government contribution increases in response to a reduction in aid inflows in a 
particular sector 
• Government contribution decreases in response to a reduction in aid inflows in a 
particular sector 
 
In order to examine the response, data on expenditure, domestic revenue and donor support 
(aid) spanning from 2000 to 2010 was collected for three key ministries that receive a lion’s 
share of aid in Malawi namely: Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Education. From the 
data, the percentage composition of government revenue and aid in the total budget of each 
ministry was calculated. Thereafter, percentage changes were calculated in each subsequent 
year and the results were plotted in a graph to more visually expose the pattern that each of 
the variables follows after each subsequent round of funding and expenditure. In addition, the 
results were then subjected to a correlation test to see how domestic revenue was related to 
aid in each of the years under review. The data that used to calculate the percentage changes 
can be found in Appendix 3. 
3.2.2 IMPACT OF ODA ON TAX EFFORT 
 
The main issue being investigated in this section is the impact of aid on the tax effort in 
Malawi. If aid is fungible, then it may reduce the tax effort because the government may 
decide to substitute tax revenue with aid resources. Furthermore, it is theorized that given 
their nature, grants are expected to reduce domestic resource mobilization because they are 
never repaid. However, loans are expected to stimulate domestic revenue mobilization 
because the government has to repay the loans and so it needs to generate resources 
domestically. Thus the hypotheses that will be tested are: 
• ODA has a negative impact on tax revenue 
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• Grants have negative impact on tax revenue 
• Loans have a positive impact on tax revenue 
To achieve this, various data on tax revenue, Real Per-capita Income, Agriculture and 
Industrial value added, Import and Exports, ODA, Grant and Loans were collected spanning 
from 1976 to 2009.  The data was subjected to a series of tests in order to ascertain whether 
or not the data meets the assumptions of OLS regression: 
i. Linearity: The relationships between the predictors and the outcome variable 
should be linear (See Appendix 3.4). 
ii. No perfect Collinearity: Collinearity (or multicollinearity) is a situation where 
the correlations among the independent variables are strong. Multicollinearity 
deceptively bloats the standard errors thus making some variables statistically 
insignificant while would otherwise be significant. In order to test for 
multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) are used. VIFs measure how 
much the variance of the estimated coefficients is increased over the case of 
no correlation among the X variables. If no two X variables are correlated, 
then all the VIFs will be 1. If VIF for one of the variables is around or greater 
than 5, there is collinearity associated with that variable. The results of the test 
indicate that the VIF for all equations ranges from 2.19 to 2.47 indicating 
marginal levels of multicollinearity (See appendix 3.6). 
iii. Homogeneity of variance (Homoscedasticity):  The error variance should be 
constant. If the error terms do not have constant variance, they are said to be 
heteroscedastic.  To test for heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test was done. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg tests the null 
hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus the alternative that the 
error variances are a multiplicative function of one or more variables. A large 
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chi-square indicates that heteroscedasticity is present. The results of the test 
indicate that equations (3) and (4) have a considerably large chi-square as 
opposed to equations (1) and (2) (See appendix 3.5) indicating the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. Heteroskedasticity causes standard errors to be biased 
which in turn violates the assumptions of OLS which assume that errors are 
both independent and identically distributed. To correct for heteroscedasticity, 
robust standard errors were used in all equations. Robust standard errors relax 
either or both of the aforementioned OLS assumptions hence when 
heteroskedasticity is present, robust standard errors tend to be more 
trustworthy. To attain robust standard errors, robust regressions were run for 
all the equations. 
 
Analyzing the data to ascertain whether or not the data meet the assumptions of OLS 
regression is important because if the data do not meet the assumptions then the results may 
be misleading.  
 
Having done these tests, four regressions were run: 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3SIZE+ β4 TRADE + β5ODA + εi,t 
….…....(5) 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6ODA + εi,t 
…(6) 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3TRADE + β4SIZE + β5F + β6L  + εi,t 
….…(7) 
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lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6F + β7L  + 
εi,t.(8) 
Because the dependent variable is nonnegative and positively skewed, a log transformation of 
the dependent variable was estimated in all equations. The data are expressed in percentage 
of GDP. 
 
CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS OF FUNGIBILITY ANALYSIS AND 
ESTIMATIONS 
 
4.1 FUNGIBILITY ANALYSIS IN THE MINISTRIES OF AGRICULTURE, 
HEALTH AND EDUCATION 
The fungibility analysis used revenue and expenditure data from 2000 to 2010 which was 
compiled from Malawi Government budget documents and expenditure reports. The choice 
of the period of study was based on the availability of credible data. The analysis used three 
main variables namely Government Expenditure (G), Government contribution to a particular 
sector (R), and Donor contribution to a particular sector.32 
For the actual analysis, percentage changes in each year were calculated for each of the three 
variables under investigation in order to establish the magnitude of the changes in the 
variables. Thereafter, the percentage changes were plotted together in order to establish the 
pattern for each variable.     
4.1.1 Fungibility analysis in the Ministry of Agriculture 
The fungibility analysis for the Ministry of Agriculture is shown in Table 1 and Figure 3.1 
below. 
 
                                                          
32 The full results of the analysis and the data can be found in Appendix 3.1 
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Table 1: Table Showing Percentage Changes in Ministry of Agriculture’s Resource 
Inflows and Expenditure 
YEAR 
% Change in Government 
Contribution (∆R) 
% Change in Aid or 
Donor Contribution 
(∆A) 
% Change in 
Expenditure (∆G) 
2000 - - - 
2001 -36.74351585 77.06682136 19.62540717 
2002 268.292205 -2.912666385 14.27790946 
2003 -9.344503416 -1.033759562 4.959516453 
2004 184.5323381 35.66666667 125.6526674 
2005 121.8113379 71.06388206 182.444668 
2006 11.63373637 150.1872944 58.63757792 
2007 94.44556332 -22.21819227 38.02778557 
2008 55.14022805 -73.37459156 33.05516752 
2009 -6.041931373 292.1753071 1.65350971 
2010 -0.669770671 -4.489442012 3.994220235 
 
Figure 3.1: Graph Showing Percentage Changes in Ministry of Agriculture’s Resource 
Inflows and Expenditure 
 
Source: MoF, OECD 
 
The analysis of the composition of funding and expenditure for the Ministry of Agriculture in 
the period 2000 to 2010 indicates that the correlation between government contribution and 
donor contribution is -0.71229 (See appendix 3.1). This implies negative relationship 
between government contribution and donor contribution thus confirming that the Malawi 
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Government substitutes its funding with donors funding.  This relationship is made more 
apparent in Table 1 and figure 3.1 above which shows that the percentage changes in 
contributions from the Malawi Government, Donor Community and the Expenditure in the 
Ministry of Agriculture from 2000 to 2010. Malawi Government’s contribution to the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s budgets reduces as donor’s percentage contribution increases and 
increases when donors’ contribution to the sector decreases. The figures also indicate that 
expenditure in the Ministry of Agriculture increases significantly when both government 
contribution and aid or donor contribution increase and decreases when both government 
contribution and aid or donor contribution decrease. 
4.1.2 Fungibility analysis in the Ministries of Education 
The fungibility analysis for the Ministry of Education is shown in Table 2 and Figure 3.1 
below. 
Table 2: Table Showing Percentage Changes in Ministry of Education’s Resource 
Inflows and Expenditure 
YEAR 
% Change in Government 
Contribution (∆R) 
% Change in Aid or 
Donor Contribution 
(∆A) 
% Change in 
Expenditure (∆G) 
2000 - - - 
2001 -11.51182528 8.035111411 72.64246816 
2002 15.98333724 852.9766438 110.3415166 
2003 17.41575693 24.74072768 19.44444444 
2004 18.35183506 92.90746583 17.82945736 
2005 17.65847976 -34.73385844 18.42105263 
2006 18.52310231 84.74284664 19.44444444 
2007 15.33840585 5.743309222 5.997888372 
2008 0.325292748 21.82928224 -10.9856335 
2009 38.88955667 -35.96449974 21.20619325 
2010 21.37787407 -36.34054516 27.0694569 
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Figure 3.2: Graph Showing Percentage Changes in Ministry of Education’s Resource 
Inflows and Expenditure 
 
Source: MoF, OECD 
The analysis of the composition of funding for the Ministry of Education in the period 2000 
to 2010 indicates that the correlation between government contribution and donor 
contribution is     -0.0137  (See appendix 3.2). This implies that there is a negative 
relationship between government contribution and donor contribution thus confirming that 
the Malawi Government substitutes its funding with donor funding but only slightly.  This 
relationship is can be seen in Table 2 and figure 3.2 above which show that the percentage 
changes in contributions from the Malawi Government, Donor Community and the 
Expenditure in the Ministry of Education from 2000 to 2010. The figures seem to indicate 
that Malawi Government’s contribution to the Ministry of Agriculture’s budgets marginally 
reduces as donor’s percentage contribution increases and marginally increases when donors’ 
contribution to the sector decreases. The figures also indicate that expenditure in the Ministry 
of Education marginally increases when both government contribution and donor 
contribution increase and marginally decreases when both government contribution and aid 
 39 
or donor contribution decrease. It should be noted, however, that even though there is a 
negative relationship between the two financing components, the magnitude is very marginal.  
4.1.3 Fungibility analysis in the Ministries of Health 
The fungibility analysis for the Ministry of Health is shown in Table 2 and Figure 3.1 below. 
Table 3: Table Showing Percentage Changes in Ministry of Health’s Resource Inflows 
and Expenditure 
YEAR 
% Change in 
Government 
Contribution (∆R) 
% Change in Aid or 
Donor Contribution 
(∆A) 
% Change in 
Expenditure (∆G) 
2000 
   2001 23.21428571 132.0380444 14.01813986 
2002 30.40583245 -81.88479459 44.17510002 
2003 52.31022821 205.8221404 31.4560888 
2004 13.13222993 77.85717763 19.98013163 
2005 21.53648566 28.55197671 16.20733655 
2006 7.028869488 -27.64940283 17.69620697 
2007 13.43623171 -11.88288378 27.62133935 
2008 75.06079479 93.58259299 23.4444115 
2009 30.85435121 -65.1393849 26.11617328 
2010 5.858204614 -11.28542746 3.734723492 
Figure 3.3: Graph Showing Percentage Changes in Ministry of Health’s Resource 
Inflows and Expenditure 
 
Source: MoF, OECD 
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The analysis of the composition of funding for the Ministry of Health in the period 2000 to 
2010 indicates that the correlation between government contribution and donor contribution 
is 0.4625  (See appendix 3.2). This implies that there is a positive relationship between 
government contribution and donor contribution.  This relationship is made more apparent in 
Table 3.3 and figure 3.3 above which show the percentage changes in contributions from the 
Malawi Government, Donor Community and the Expenditure in the Ministry of Health from 
2000 to 2010. The figures seem to indicate that Malawi Government’s contribution to the 
Ministry of Health’s budgets reduces as donor’s percentage contribution reduces and 
increases when donors’ contribution to the sector increases.  
4.2 Regression Results on Impact of ODA on Tax Effort 
The following of regression were run to ascertain the impact of ODA on tax revenue in 
Malawi (Where LnTGDP is the natural log of tax revenue as a share of GDP, Imports (IMP) 
and exports (EXP) are disaggregated from TRADE and represent openness of the economy, 
Official Development Aid (ODA) is comprised of both grants and loans, (AGR) is 
agricultural value added, (IND) is industry value added, the level of economic development 
(SIZE) expressed as real income per capita, F is share of grants flows as a share of GDP, and 
L is for loans flows expressed as share of GDP. 
.  lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3SIZE+ β4 TRADE + β5ODA + εi,t 
….…....(5) 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6ODA + εi,t 
…(6) 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3TRADE + β4SIZE + β5F + β6L  + εi,t 
….…(7) 
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lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6F + β7L  + 
εi,t.(8) 
 
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 4 below.  
 
Table 4: Regression Results 
DETERMINANTS OF TAX REVENUE 
VARIABLE REGR 1 REGR 2 REGR 3 REGR 4 
ODA 
  
0.19065*** 0.1864*** 
   
(0.04883) (0.0450) 
GRANTS 0.37936** 0.025175 
  
 
(0.01807) (0.018753) 
  LOANS 0.28229***  0.291787*** 
  
 
(0.08166) (0.078561) 
  AGR -0.04153 -0.032415 -0.09691 -0.0760 
 
(0.07257) (0.069873) (0.07296) (0.0678) 
IND -0.17151 -0.207904* 
-
0.38325*** -0.4400*** 
 
(0.12305) (0.119847) (0.12543) (0.1180) 
TRADE 0.06135 
 
-0.05255  
 
(0.03661) 
 
(0.03646)  
IMP 
 
0.107793** 
 
0.0011 
  
0.043667 
 
(0.0404) 
EXP 
 
-0.059614 
 
-0.2086*** 
  
0.076041 
 
(0.0732) 
RGDP 0.01964 0.024708 0.04924 0.0508 
 
(0.03178) (0.030641) (0.03519) (0.0324) 
OBSERVATTIONS 33 33 33 33 
P VALUE 
           0.000                 
0.000  
            
0.000  
             
0.000  
OVERALL R2 0.7228 0.7544 0.6812 0.7391 
F 11.3 10.97 11.54 12.28 
 ***Significant at 1 percent ** Significant at 5 percent * Significant at 10 percent 
 
As far as the impact of ODA on tax effort is concerned, ODA in general terms seems to have 
a positive impact on the tax effort in Malawi. This finding is inconsistent with a lot of other 
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studies that have been conducted [for instance, Gupta et al. (2003) and Morrissey et al. 
(2006)] which found a negative relationship between ODA and tax effort.  
When ODA is disaggregated into grants and loans, the results show that both grants and loans 
have a positive impact on tax effort. This is contrary to most other studies which found that 
grants are negatively related to tax effort and loans positively related. The logic behind is that 
because grants are treated as free resource inflows, the government may use the resources to 
substitute for taxes. On the other hand, because loans have to be repaid, the government is 
compelled to collect more taxes to service the loans and so tax effort increases.   
 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
5.1 Analysis of  Fungibility results for Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health 
in Malawi 
The results of the of the fungibility analysis of the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and 
Health seem to indicate that aid fungibility is most prevalent in Ministries of Agriculture and 
very slightly in Education. The correlation coefficients for the percentages changes in 
government contribution and donor contribution were found to be negative (-0.71229 for 
Agriculture and -0.0137 for Education) thus implying an inverse relationship between the two 
financing components. This fundamentally shows that the Malawi Government reduces its 
contribution to the Ministry of Agriculture when donors decide to increase their contribution 
and conversely, the Malawi Government increases its contribution to the Ministry Agriculture 
of when donors decide to reduce their contribution. However, as for the Ministry of 
Education, the though the correlation coefficient was found to be slightly negative, the 
overall effect substitution effect of the two financing components may not have any 
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significant impact on the sector. In light of this, it may be safe to conclude that aid fungibility 
may not be an issue for the Education sector. 
In the case of the Ministry of Agriculture, an ideal situation ought to be that the Malawi 
Government contribution and donor contribution should rise simultaneously in order to have 
meaningful impact in these sectors. However, it is apparent from the analysis that the 
Government of Malawi substitutes its own contribution with donor contribution thereby 
reducing the net expenditure in the two sectors. This in turn may adversely affects the impact 
of aid in the Ministry of Agriculture thereby contributing to aid ineffectiveness in the 
Agricultural Sector and in Malawi as a whole. It should be noted that the most likely reason 
why aid fungibility exists in the agricultural sector is because the Malawian economy is 
heavily reliant on agriculture and therefore the sector enjoys the biggest share of the National 
Budget.33 Consequently, the Agricultural sector has always been given the main focus not 
only for government but also for the ruling political leadership who in most cases divert a 
very large share of the Ministry of Agricultures resources to finance programs pro-poor such 
as free inputs, free livestock and universal subsidies for all poor people in order to gain 
political support to win the next election. Commentators have argued that since these 
programs target poor people who are mostly subsistence farmers, then the overall impact of 
these programs on the development of the Agriculture sector is negligible and therefore it 
would be more prudent to use such resources for initiatives that would have a more 
significant impact on the development of the sector. In addition, the fact that these programs 
are used as a political tool by the ruling political leadership makes it easy for the ruling 
government to easily divert resources (which include aid resources) from the Ministry of 
                                                          
33 Agriculture accounts for approximately one third of the GDP and 90% of export  revenues in 
Malawi 
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Agriculture to finance the programs thereby contributing to aid fungibility and consequently 
aid ineffectiveness in the sector. 
On the other hand, the results of the fungibility analysis in the Ministry of Health are quite 
interesting. The results revealed no evidence of aid fungibility and the correlation coefficient 
for the percentage changes in government contribution and donor contribution was found to 
be positive (0.4625) thus implying concurrent relationship between the two financing 
components. This implies that the Malawi Government reduces its contribution to the 
Ministry when donors decide to reduce their contribution. Conversely, when donors decide to 
increase their contribution, the Malawi Government similarly increases its contribution.   In 
an ideal situation, government contribution is expected to increase regardless of changes in 
donor contribution. The fact that government contribution and donor contributions are 
positively related implies that the net impact on the sector increases when both government 
and donors increase their contribution and vice versa.  This implies that government 
contribution decreases in anticipation of aid inflows thus confirming that the Malawi 
Government substitutes its funding with donors funding.   
5.2  Analysis  of Regression Results on Impact of ODA on Tax Effort 
Regression results indicate that ODA seems to have a positive impact on the tax effort in 
Malawi. This finding is inconsistent with a lot of other studies that have been conducted [for 
instance, Gupta et al. (2003) and Morrissey et al. (2006)] which suggest that ODA is 
negatively related to tax effort. In Malawi’s case, the positive relationship between ODA and 
tax effort is because a large percentage of the ODA that is received such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) credit facility is conditional aid which requires the country to achieve 
certain milestones in the area of good economic governance. Good economic governance 
includes tax administration and this therefore compels the Malawi Government to ensure that 
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the tax effort remains at a level that is required by the ODA financing institution in order to 
secure the much needed resources to implement finance government expenditure. In addition 
to this, since Malawi is a net importer, a considerable percentage of ODA is used to finance 
imports which attract import duty which directly raises tax revenue. Furthermore, the Malawi 
Government is the biggest consumer of goods and services in Malawi’s small economy and 
in so doing the Government uses ODA which constitutes about 60% of the Government 
budget. When procuring those goods and services the government collects value added tax 
(VAT) which it remits to the Malawi Revenue Authority thereby increasing the tax revenue. 
When ODA is disaggregated into grants and loans, the results show that both grants and loans 
have a positive impact on tax effort. This is contrary to most other studies which found that 
grants are negatively related to tax effort and loans positively related. The logic behind is that 
because grants are treated as free resource inflows, the government may use the resources to 
substitute for taxes. On the other hand, because loans have to be repaid, the government is 
compelled to collect more taxes to service the loans and so tax effort increases.  As for the 
positive relationship between grants and tax effort, this can be explained by the fact that most 
of the ODA is conditional and hence the Malawi Government is compelled to ensuring that 
the tax effort remains at a level that is required by the ODA financing institution in order to 
secure the much needed resources to implement finance government expenditure. It can also 
be explained by the fact that since Malawi is a net importer, a considerable percentage of 
grants is used to finance imports which attract import duty thereby raising tax revenue. In 
addition to this, according to Fagernäs et. al. (2004) grants are associated with development 
budget expenditure in Malawi. Consequently, increases in grants lead to higher development 
budget expenditure which has a positive effect on economic growth in Malawi. In turn, this 
conomic growth leads to increased business activities which inturn help to increase tax 
revenue.  
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As for the positive  relationship between loans and tax effort,  this is in line with many other  
studies which found that loans stimulate tax effort. The logic behind is that Governments tend 
to rely on the primary domestic source of revenue (tax revenue) to service both local and 
foreign loans hence the tax effort increases.   
Fundamentally, the results indicate that the Government of Malawi does not substitute aid 
resources for tax revenue but instead ODA helps to  provide much needed impetous for the 
Government to increase tax collection efforts in Malawi. 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
The generic purpose of this research study was to produce credible empirical evidence on aid 
fungibility in Malawi. To this end, the paper looked at two forms of fungibility namely: 
whether or not aid substitutes for government funding; and whether or not aid is used to 
reduce taxes effort in Malawi. First and foremost, the paper investigated whether or not aid 
resources substitute for government funding in three key sectors that traditionally receive the 
lion’s share of ODA in Malawi namely; Agriculture, Education and Health. This was 
achieved by calculating the percentage composition of government revenue and aid in the 
total budget of each Ministry. Thereafter, percentage changes were calculated in each 
subsequent year and the results were plotted in a graph to more visually expose the pattern 
that each of the variables follows after each subsequent round of funding and expenditure. In 
addition, the results were then subjected to a correlation test to see how domestic revenue was 
related to aid in each of the years under review. The paper also investigated whether or not 
aid resources substitute for government revenue collection efforts by examining the impact of 
ODA on tax effort in Malawi. To achieve this, the study adopted and utilized a regression 
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model that was used by Gupta et al. (2003) in an IMF paper that analyzed the effects of 
foreign aid on revenue response in several countries. 
The results of the fungibility analysis of the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health 
seem to indicate that aid fungibility is prevalent in Ministries of Agriculture and Education. 
The results revealed that aid fungibility is most prevalent in the Ministry of Agriculture and 
marginally in the Ministry of Education. This fundamentally shows that the Malawi 
Government reduces its contribution to the Ministry of Agriculture when donors decide to 
increase their contribution and conversely, the Malawi Government increases its contribution 
to the Ministry when donors decide to reduce their contribution. This in turn may adversely 
affect the impact of aid in the Ministry and the sector as a whole. Given the magnitude of 
resources that are allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture and the overall economic 
importance of the sector to Malawi’s economy, the existence of aid fungibility in the 
Agriculture sector poses an eminent risk to aid effectiveness in Malawi.  
The results of the analysis of the impact of ODA on tax effort in Malawi show that ODA has 
a positive impact on the tax effort in Malawi. The results also show that when ODA is 
disaggregated into grants and loans, they both have a positive impact on tax effort. The 
positive relationship between ODA and tax effort is because a large percentage of the ODA 
that is received is conditional aid which requires the country to achieve certain milestones in 
the area of good economic governance. Good economic governance includes tax 
administration and therefore this compels the Malawi Government to ensure that the tax 
effort remains at a level that is required by the ODA financing institution in order to secure 
the much needed resources to finance government expenditure. In addition to this, since 
Malawi is a net importer, a considerable percentage of ODA is used to finance imports which 
attract import duty which directly raises tax revenue. Furthermore, the Malawi Government is 
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the biggest consumer of goods and services in Malawi’s small economy and in so doing the 
Government uses ODA which constitutes about 60% of the Government budget. When 
procuring those goods and services the government collects value added tax (VAT) which it 
remits to the Malawi Revenue Authority thereby increasing the tax revenue. 
As for the positive  relationship between loans and tax effort,  the logic behind is that 
Governments tend to rely on the primary domestic source of revenue (tax revenue) to service 
both local and foreign loans hence the tax effort increases.   
6.2 Policy Recommendations 
Having established that aid is fungible especially in the Ministry of Agriculture which is one 
of the government institutions that receives the lion’s share of aid resources in Malawi, it 
would be in the best interest for the Government to ensure that the fungibility phenomenon is 
promptly assess whether or not the phenomenon is contributing to aid ineffectiveness in the 
sector so as to  avoid frustrating donor institutions. A number of studies have suggested 
different ways of dealing with the problem of fungibility. For instance, Stefan Leiderer 
(2012) advocates for Aid on Delivery (AoD). AoD is a form of aid that is disbursed 
proportionally to the achievement of pre-defined goals by the recipient country. This is 
intended to allow donors to fund expenditure on their priorities without having to get 
involved in implementation.34 Others like Göran Holmqvist (2000) advocate for donors to 
simply offer a mix of General Budget Support (GBS) and AoD and decide on a level of 
indicated government commitment at which they will convert either the entire aid budget or 
just the GBS tranche to project aid.35 However, I believe strategies to address fungibility 
should not be wholesale but should be unique to every aid recipient country depending on the 
                                                          
34 Leiderer, Stefan. Fungibility and the Choice of Aid Modalities, Working Paper No. 2012/68 (2012), online, 
Internet, 5, Feb. 2013. 
35 Holmqvist, Göran. Fungibility Parameters: A Comment on their Reliability and Policy Implications from an 
Aid Practitioner (2000), online, Stockholm University, Institute of Latin America Studies, internet, 3 Feb. 2013 
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nature and the circumstances within which the fungibility phenomena occurs.  In this regard, 
I believe the following solutions would be more appropriate for the Malawi Government and 
Donors to address aid fungibility in Malawi: 
(i) Donors should tie aid to particular public expenditure programs so as to ensure that 
funds are used to finance agreed programmes as opposed to using basket funding or 
channeling aid money through General Budget Support. 
(ii) There is need for comprehensive research in order to ascertain what the fungible 
resources ultimately end up financing. If the funds are used to finance development 
initiatives in the country then the country would be better off and the diverted funds 
would be easier to justify to donors. But if the resources are used for personal gain or 
used to finance non-essential services then measures should be taken to ensure the 
funds are not diverted from their targeted activities. 
(iii) In addition, there is need to conduct a more comprehensive study to holistic examine 
the fungibility phenomenon and analyze its impact in all other sectors that receive aid 
in Malawi. This will help to clarify whether or not fungibility of aid is negatively 
contributing to aid effectiveness in Malawi. 
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APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF AID AND FISCAL 
BEHAVIOUR ADOPTED FROM PAPER BY BADRI PRASAD 
BHATTARAI ENTITLED “FOREIGN AID AND GOVERNMENT’S 
FISCAL BEHAVIOUR IN NEPAL: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
STUDY SAMPLE METHODOLOGY RESULTS/FINDINGS COMMENTS 
Heller (1975) 11 African  
countries 
(1960–1970) 
Used cross section 
time  series data, and 
GLS and 2SLS 
Aid increased  
investment but  reduced 
taxes and borrowings 
Seminal work on 
fiscal response model 
and used 
government’s utility 
maximization 
framework 
Pack and Pack 
(1990) 
Indonesia,(1970
–1990) 
Time-series data  and 
used SUR 
Aid did not lead to a 
reduction in domestic 
revenue efforts, but 
stimulated total public 
expenditure  
Model derived from 
“median voter 
model”. Focused 
more on aid 
fungibility rather than 
fiscal impact 
Khilji and  
Zampelli (1991) 
Pakistan (1960–
1986) 
Time-series data  and 
used FIML 
technique 
Aid was found to be fully 
fungible McGuire type 
model. 
Examined only the 
US aid  
Gang and Khan 
(1991) 
India (1961–
1984) 
Used time series data 
and estimated full 
system of 
simultaneous 
equation with 3SLS 
procedure 
Grants, loans and 
multilateral aid had no 
significant effect on 
government consumption 
Heller type model. 
Due to 
misspecification of 
model there exist 
problems in the 
interpretation of 
results 
Khan and 
Hoshino (1992)  
5 South and 
South East 
Asian countries  
(1956–1976) 
Pooled time series 
and cross section 
data, non-linear 
3SLS  
Loans were found more  
positive for investment 
than grants, and while 
grants reduced tax 
burdens, loans increased 
it 
Extension of Heller 
model. Failed to 
show total effects 
(direct and  indirect) 
and thus ignored 
feedback effects 
Pack and Pack  
(1993) 
Dominican  
Republic (1968–
1986) 
Time-series data  and 
used SUR 
Found a  divergence of 
aid away from its 
intended purpose 
Model derived from 
“median voter 
model” The results 
are different from 
their findings for 
Indonesia.  Thus, 
fungibility depends 
on  country specific 
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factors 
Feyzioglu et al. 
(1998)  
14 and 38 
developing  
countries 
(1971–1990) 
Panel data, OLS  and 
GMM 
Aid was not fungible at 
the aggregate level in a 
sample of 14 countries 
but aid was found to be 
fungible in 38 countries 
McGuire (1978) type 
model. Aid was 
found to be more 
fungible in 
agriculture,  
education and energy 
sector 
Franco-
Rodriguez et 
al.(1998) 
Pakistan (1956–
1995) 
Time-series data, 
non-linear 3SLS  
Slightly positive impact 
on public investment and 
negative impact on tax 
effort  
Extended the Heller 
model by allowing 
borrowing on both 
capital and 
consumption 
expenditure and 
treating aid as  an 
endogenous variable 
Swaroop et al. 
(2000) 
India (1970–
1995) 
Time-series  data, 
and used OLS and 
2SLS  
Foreign aid did not 
influence the internally 
determined pattern of 
resource allocation   
McGuire (1978) type 
model. Aid 
fungibility 
investigated in both 
federal and  state 
levels  
Franco- 
Rodriguez 
(2000) 
Costa Rica 
(1971–1994) 
Time-series data, 
non-linear 3SLS 
A very small impact of 
aid  inflows on public 
sector fiscal behavior 
Heller type model. 
Not conclusive  
result; it could be due 
to inappropriate 
target variables and 
country specific 
factors 
McGillivray 
(2000) 
Pakistan (1956–
1995) 
Time-series data, 
non-linear3SLS 
Aid associated positively 
with both public 
investment and 
consumption expenditure 
and aid had no impact on  
taxation 
Heller type model. 
Disaggregated aid 
into grants and loan 
aid, but aid was not 
endogenised in the 
model 
McGillivray 
(2002)  
Philippines 
(1960–1997) 
Time-series data, 
non-linear 3SLS 
Almost all multilateral 
aid has been  allocated to 
consumption expenditure 
and almost 100 per cent 
domestic borrowing 
allocated to the 
consumption budget 
Heller type model. 
Ambiguous results as 
he found multilateral 
aid was also allocated 
to consumption 
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McGillivray and 
Ouattara   
(2003) 
Cote d’Ivoire 
(1975–1999) 
 
Time-series data and 
applied fiscal 
response model as a 
maximizing utility 
framework,  
nonlinear  3SLS 
Large portion of aid is 
used for debt servicing 
and it does not induce a  
reduction in borrowing; 
also borrowing is used 
for both investment and  
consumption 
Heller type model. 
The findings suggest 
that borrowing should 
be  allowed for both 
capital and  
consumption 
expenditure in the 
model  
Source:Badri,Prasad,Bhattarai:http://eap-journal.com/archive/v37_i1_3.pdf
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APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4 
 
FIG. 2A: Composition  of Aid Donors in current USD (1970-2009) 
 
FIG. 2B: Composition by sector 
 
 
 
Fig. 2C: Aid Composition Trends (1995-2009) 
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Figure 2D: Total Government Revenue as a percentage of GDP (1990-2010) 
 
Source: IMF, MoF 
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Figure 2E: Government Expenditure as a percentage of GDP (1970-2009) 
 
Source: IMF, MoF 
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APPENDIX 3: ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Appendix 3.1: Source of funding and expenditure 
SECTOR 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
GOV'NT
7,222,660,000     6,391,200,000     7,412,727,050       8,703,709,575       10,301,000,000     12,120,000,000     14,365,000,000     16,568,362,000     16,622,257,680     23,086,580,000     28,022,000,000           
DONOR
148,100,000        160,000,000        1,524,762,630       1,902,000,000       3,669,100,000       2,394,680,000       4,424,000,000       4,678,084,000       5,699,276,160       3,649,560,000       2,323,290,000             
EXPENDITURE
2,974,069,535     5,134,507,050     10,800,000,000     12,900,000,000     15,200,000,000     18,000,000,000     21,500,000,000     22,789,546,000     20,285,970,000     24,587,852,000     31,243,650,000           
GOV'NT
2,296,000,000     2,829,000,000     3,689,181,000       5,619,000,000       6,356,900,000       7,725,952,857       8,269,000,000       9,380,042,000       16,420,776,077     21,487,300,000     22,746,070,000           
DONOR
1,863,056,557     4,323,000,000     783,120,330          2,394,955,355       4,259,600,000       5,475,800,000       3,961,774,000       3,491,001,000       6,757,970,257       2,355,870,000       2,090,000,000             
EXPENDITURE
3,726,600,000     4,249,000,000     6,126,000,000       8,053,000,000       9,662,000,000       11,227,952,857     13,214,874,633     16,865,000,000     20,818,900,000     26,256,000,000     27,236,589,000           
GOV'NT
694,000,000        439,000,000        1,616,802,780       1,465,720,589       4,170,449,062       9,250,528,860       10,326,711,000     20,079,831,376     31,151,896,189     29,269,720,000     29,073,680,000           
DONOR
529,000,000        936,683,485        909,401,020          900,000,000          1,221,000,000       2,088,690,000       5,225,637,000       4,064,594,924       1,082,215,000       4,244,180,000       4,053,640,000             
EXPENDITURE
1,228,000,000     1,469,000,000     1,678,742,490       1,762,000,000       3,976,000,000       11,230,000,000     17,815,000,000     24,589,650,000     32,717,800,000     33,258,792,000     34,587,221,400           
AGRICULTURE
EDUCATION
HEALTH
 
Source: MoF, OECD 
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Appendix 3.2: Minstry Budget Contribution by Source (as a share of total funding) 
1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Public Contribution 34.33         24.21          64.16         33.36            45.73            75.48            79.17            73.63            
Donor Aid 65.67         75.79          35.84         66.64            54.27            24.52            20.83            26.37            
Public Contribution 56.31          70.65         48.74            16.86            11.98            
Donor Aid 43.69          29.35         51.26            83.14            88.02            
Public Contribution 19.21          78.38         59.81            69.55            75.89            76.01            84.00            
Donor Aid 80.79          21.62         40.19            30.45            24.11            23.99            16.00            
As a % share of Total Funding
EDUCATION
HEALTH
AGRICULTURE
 
 
Appendix 3.3: Correlation Results 
Malawi Gov. Donors
Malawi Gov. 1
Donors -1 1
Min. of Agriculture
  
Malawi Gov. Donors
Malawi Gov. 1
Donors -1 1
Min of Health
 
Malawi Gov. Donors
Malawi Gov. 1
Donors -1 1
Min. of Education
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Appendix 3.4: Data 
 
YEARS TAX REVENUE ODA GDP RGDP AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY TRADE IMPORTS EXPORTS GRANTS LOANS
1976 73,060,000           10,235,560,000    111,271,508,382.62  1,265.38 52,543,163,790.73    23,458,739,327.14    10,790,000,000.00    43,254,071,640.89    33,872,356,228.24    2,435,220,000.00      8,354,780,000.00    
1977 89,950,000           13,099,060,000    133,839,829,389.97  1,283.33 58,019,188,728.77    28,193,115,445.35    17,314,796,000.00    46,347,556,303.86    40,151,948,816.99    2,108,200,000.00      15,206,596,000.00  
1978 121,960,000         16,302,860,000    157,531,252,193.10  1,361.86 86,244,926,573.52    40,952,868,777.59    30,412,528,000.00    64,767,436,180.10    36,534,972,353.11    11,389,260,000.00    19,023,268,000.00  
1979 143,800,000         23,475,720,000    175,676,962,155.88  1,376.86 80,597,980,467.60    41,546,813,123.16    46,247,766,000.00    71,733,915,484.69    40,744,051,146.40    17,886,500,000.00    28,361,266,000.00  
1980 166,870,000         23,435,880,000    205,450,814,804.98  1,341.51 73,863,122,089.10    40,258,090,645.94    33,655,670,000.00    79,719,247,062.91    51,040,758,952.84    8,047,680,000.00      25,607,990,000.00  
1981 179,050,000         22,682,240,000    205,455,825,561.18  1,236.99 72,930,353,379.81    37,410,957,840.53    18,902,918,000.00    64,709,038,165.81    52,731,376,660.05    10,921,140,000.00    7,981,778,000.00    
1982 207,680,000         19,958,180,000    195,895,435,724.36  1,237.42 77,543,824,270.00    39,320,254,190.20    20,811,918,000.00    56,507,088,997.88    44,067,036,841.66    8,125,700,000.00      12,686,218,000.00  
1983 238,860,000         19,171,340,000    203,055,937,060.81  1,250.32 75,515,457,917.10    36,045,387,160.82    15,441,154,000.00    57,511,322,243.89    42,137,288,189.51    6,517,160,000.00      8,923,994,000.00    
1984 296,180,000         30,099,120,000    200,532,329,591.66  1,274.58 71,617,471,121.68    36,599,318,503.78    15,522,494,000.00    52,992,966,207.86    56,892,271,345.50    5,838,220,000.00      9,684,274,000.00    
1985 373,510,000         18,668,360,000    187,803,731,588.95  1,277.67 76,199,927,347.78    38,013,901,666.11    17,073,930,000.00    56,150,896,048.91    45,432,493,787.05    6,261,520,000.00      10,812,410,000.00  
1986 391,070,000         32,285,340,000    196,489,861,982.55  1,209.57 84,581,997,275.38    42,954,117,209.67    18,687,284,000.00    49,218,351,907.47    45,017,220,383.65    9,956,680,000.00      8,730,604,000.00    
1987 450,150,000         45,789,440,000    196,390,071,310.39  1,158.55 99,483,187,566.93    47,674,851,882.56    30,646,588,000.00    54,615,846,832.51    49,986,238,993.33    22,903,020,000.00    7,743,568,000.00    
1988 653,730,000         62,349,600,000    229,067,423,183.39  1,127.63 107,027,373,245.76  62,636,438,923.50    33,872,466,000.00    74,545,429,155.12    53,423,575,220.75    28,349,480,000.00    5,522,986,000.00    
1989 844,550,000         69,271,800,000    263,973,870,512.78  1,087.91 120,146,687,087.67  77,134,575,897.90    47,259,536,000.00    91,117,368,384.39    49,574,053,465.01    31,614,700,000.00    15,644,836,000.00  
1990 887,960,000         83,059,760,000    312,210,374,937.45  1,109.43 145,026,663,800.99  89,251,660,772.35    52,221,276,000.00    104,343,101,250.06  74,250,101,113.38    37,632,200,000.00    14,589,076,000.00  
1991 921,710,000         91,228,620,000    365,787,319,791.16  1,180.76 104,351,072,028.31  84,752,049,709.15    56,274,000,000.00    107,202,424,294.70  85,124,501,690.87    40,241,720,000.00    16,032,280,000.00  
1992 1,150,000,000      95,788,640,000    298,721,489,650.84  1,083.10 153,930,720,402.09  75,890,788,937.47    73,219,944,000.00    126,824,696,402.85  69,321,981,997.70    55,641,540,000.00    17,578,404,000.00  
1993 1,317,440,000      82,392,440,000    343,727,289,092.65  1,183.20 43,828,762,296.24    37,910,433,588.05    51,332,346,000.00    110,755,706,532.17  55,444,249,947.34    33,616,660,000.00    17,715,686,000.00  
1994 2,131,000,000      78,043,240,000    196,179,002,462.17  1,056.54 62,319,221,664.50    40,281,056,913.59    53,486,528,000.00    121,130,990,137.32  58,133,374,820.52    38,286,240,000.00    15,200,288,000.00  
1995 3,965,770,000      72,067,240,000    231,978,017,011.97  1,219.41 118,964,413,590.24  66,316,932,576.12    74,003,132,000.00    111,554,556,727.99  70,448,200,951.37    43,558,400,000.00    30,444,732,000.00  
1996 5,807,320,000      81,595,640,000    378,651,658,722.31  1,284.30 134,007,458,743.76  74,355,610,794.32    63,216,618,000.00    120,701,540,441.88  86,430,091,762.25    33,163,480,000.00    30,053,138,000.00  
1997 8,146,960,000      57,079,100,000    442,115,804,870.18  1,300.90 93,544,648,515.35    48,062,619,681.56    27,620,574,000.00    148,486,381,871.83  94,420,503,534.09    19,632,820,000.00    7,987,754,000.00    
1998 10,432,850,000    72,130,320,000    290,597,179,637.53  1,314.23 101,412,459,340.75  48,865,353,564.89    53,687,554,000.00    110,732,099,325.51  95,229,166,683.50    35,492,460,000.00    18,195,094,000.00  
1999 13,448,820,000    74,138,920,000    294,803,002,202.39  1,315.79 103,210,369,265.64  46,766,910,598.32    62,844,114,000.00    127,631,105,300.96  82,610,524,431.42    42,325,020,000.00    20,519,094,000.00  
2000 17,309,000,000    74,054,260,000    289,422,082,368.00  1,300.05 100,534,260,174.99  43,259,233,252.81    51,588,318,000.00    102,267,243,805.42  74,102,624,194.35    37,753,380,000.00    13,834,938,000.00  
2001 20,786,651,331    67,965,380,000    284,939,460,171.50  1,203.16 152,684,127,878.98  74,013,436,765.70    49,777,922,000.00    111,488,767,827.65  79,758,049,248.09    38,722,820,000.00    11,055,102,000.00  
2002 24,145,762,095    62,771,240,000    442,416,434,146.42  1,192.21 132,787,899,677.08  72,004,803,348.30    62,202,026,000.00    151,103,280,632.86  92,034,402,682.04    37,686,980,000.00    24,515,046,000.00  
2003 37,563,843,257    86,009,580,000    402,492,891,945.91  1,225.48 138,081,912,516.94  69,504,146,501.87    56,483,824,000.00    163,396,334,397.85  107,452,380,929.09  56,733,820,000.00    (249,996,000.00)     
2004 50,743,032,551    83,931,260,000    435,781,149,390.59  1,258.90 135,913,208,706.40  70,893,683,670.39    72,655,544,000.00    188,233,441,681.32  108,770,361,955.42  66,776,820,000.00    5,878,724,000.00    
2005 61,865,951,701    95,176,100,000    457,401,348,611.71  1,256.40 148,616,882,892.68  80,849,229,483.20    83,359,224,000.00    238,703,554,133.23  109,990,669,188.95  75,842,080,000.00    7,517,144,000.00    
2006 79,668,664,860    115,906,180,000  517,412,490,052.07  1,314.92 164,894,495,396.72  88,807,386,569.86    471,264,538,000.00  243,740,817,037.53  117,030,707,455.97  452,726,820,000.00  18,537,718,000.00  
2007 98,945,281,851    123,502,340,000  574,083,306,004.37  1,350.84 194,256,542,903.49  103,574,723,336.10  133,720,304,000.00  201,734,378,168.26  155,404,028,109.98  134,463,320,000.00  (743,016,000.00)     
2008 122,981,226,772  153,330,880,000  676,307,830,014.05  1,423.47 225,408,132,253.60  118,982,448,369.82  140,881,876,000.00  317,247,318,291.22  199,673,646,088.02  116,683,060,000.00  24,198,816,000.00  
2009 147,447,826,996  128,218,400,000  784,762,677,814.62  1,485.28 243,468,347,545.83  127,230,438,422.59  21,188,738,000.00    295,949,826,048.90  235,801,692,238.88  163,356,284,000.00  21,188,738,000.00  
 60 
Appendix 3.5: Scatter Plots (Linearity Test) 
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Appendix 3.6: Heteroscedasticity Test 
i. lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3TRADE + β4SIZE + β5F + β6L  + 
εi,t…………..…(1) 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
             Ho: Constant variance 
             Variables: fitted values of lntgdp 
              chi2(1)      =     0.02 
              Prob > chi2  =   0.8965 
ii. lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6F + β7L  + 
εi,t …….…(2) 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
            Ho: Constant variance 
            Variables: fitted values of lntgdp 
             chi2(1)      =     0.13 
             Prob > chi2  =   0.7191 
iii. lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3SIZE+ β4 TRADE + β5ODA + εi,t 
….……………...(3) 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
            Ho: Constant variance 
            Variables: fitted values of lntgdp 
             chi2(1)      =     1.54 
             Prob > chi2  =   0.2144 
iv. lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6ODA + εi,t 
…………...(4) 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
            Ho: Constant variance 
            Variables: fitted values of lntgdp 
             chi2(1)      =     1.83 
             Prob > chi2  =   0.1760 
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Appendix 3.7: Multicollinearity Test 
i. lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3TRADE + β4SIZE + β5F + β6L  + εi,t 
…………..…(1) 
                                                 
  Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
       agric |      3.04    0.328899
         ind |      2.87    0.347961
       trade |      2.47    0.404888
        rgdp |      2.08    0.481189
      loans2 |      1.72    0.581688
      grants |      1.28    0.783344
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      2.24   
 
ii. lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6F + β7L  + 
εi,t …….…(2) 
                                                              
 Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
       agric |      3.06    0.326983
         ind |      2.96    0.338045
         imp |      2.46    0.406040
        rgdp |      2.10    0.477091
      loans2 |      1.73    0.579150
         exp |      1.55    0.645885
      grants |      1.49    0.670484
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      2.19  
 
iii. lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3SIZE+ β4 TRADE + β5ODA + εi,t 
….……………...(3) 
 66 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
       agric |      2.77    0.360405
         ind |      2.70    0.370891
         oda |      2.36    0.424334
        rgdp |      2.30    0.434737
       trade |      2.21    0.452154
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      2.47  
iv. lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6ODA + εi,t 
…………...(4) 
                                                                          
Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
       agric |      2.82    0.354259
         ind |      2.81    0.355986
         oda |      2.36    0.423772
        rgdp |      2.30    0.434605
         imp |      2.06    0.485489
         exp |      1.40    0.712725
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      2.29  
 
 
 
Appendix 3.8: Regression Results 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3TRADE + β4SIZE + β5F + β6L  + εi,t 
…………..…(1) 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6F + β7L  + εi,t 
…….…(2) 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3SIZE+ β4 TRADE + β5ODA + εi,t 
….……………...(3) 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6ODA + εi,t 
…………...(4) 
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RESULTS: 
DETERMINANTS OF TAX REVENUE 
VARIABLE REGR 1 REGR 2 REGR 3 REGR 4 
ODA 
  
0.19065*** 0.1864*** 
   
(0.04883) (0.0450) 
GRANTS 0.37936** 0.025175 
  
 
(0.01807) (0.018753) 
  LOANS 0.28229*** 0.291787*** 
  
 
(0.08166) (0.078561) 
  AGR -0.04153 -0.032415 -0.09691 -0.0760 
 
(0.07257) (0.069873) (0.07296) (0.0678) 
IND -0.17151 -0.207904* 
-
0.38325*** -0.4400*** 
 
(0.12305) (0.119847) (0.12543) (0.1180) 
TRADE 0.06135 
 
-0.05255  
 
(0.03661) 
 
(0.03646)  
IMP 
 
0.107793** 
 
0.0011 
  
0.043667 
 
(0.0404) 
EXP 
 
-0.059614 
 
-0.2086*** 
  
0.076041 
 
(0.0732) 
RGDP 0.01964 0.024708 0.04924 0.0508 
 
(0.03178) (0.030641) (0.03519) (0.0324) 
OBSERVATTIONS 33 33 33 33 
P VALUE 
        
0.000  
               
0.000  
            
0.000  
             
0.000  
OVERALL R2 0.7228 0.7544 0.6812 0.7391 
F 11.3 10.97 11.54 12.28 
***Significant at 1 percent, ** Significant at 5 percent, * Significant at 10 percent 
 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3TRADE + β4SIZE + β5F + β6L  + εi,t 
……………(1) 
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lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6F + β7L  + εi,t 
………(2) 
 
 69 
 
 
lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3SIZE+ β4 TRADE + β5ODA + εi,t 
….…………...(3) 
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lnTGDPi,t = β0 + β1AGRIC + β2 IND+ β3IMP + β4EXP + β5SIZE + β6ODA + εi,t 
…………...(4) 
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